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Abstract
Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A
growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific
private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models’ structure or their
observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a
handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role.
This paper examines the effect that overfitting and influence have on the ability of an attacker to learn
information about the training data from machine learning models, either through training set member-
ship inference or attribute inference attacks. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate
a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine
learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership
inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference
attacks. Interestingly, our formal analysis also shows that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks
and begins to shed light on what other factors may be in play. Finally, we explore the connection between
membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two
that lead to effective new attacks.
1 Introduction
Machine learning has emerged as an important technology, enabling a wide range of applications including
computer vision, machine translation, health analytics, and advertising, among others. The fact that many
compelling applications of this technology involve the collection and processing of sensitive personal data has
given rise to concerns about privacy [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]. In particular, when machine learning algorithms are
applied to private training data, the resulting models might unwittingly leak information about that data
through either their behavior (i.e., black-box attack) or the details of their structure (i.e., white-box attack).
Although there has been a significant amount of work aimed at developing machine learning algorithms
that satisfy definitions such as differential privacy [8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], the factors that bring about spe-
cific types of privacy risk in applications of standard machine learning algorithms are not well under-
stood. Following the connection between differential privacy and stability from statistical learning the-
ory [12,13,14,15,16,17], one such factor that has started to emerge [4,7] as a likely culprit is overfitting. A
machine learning model is said to overfit to its training data when its performance on unseen test data di-
verges from the performance observed during training, i.e., its generalization error is large. The relationship
between privacy risk and overfitting is further supported by recent results that suggest the contrapositive,
i.e., under certain reasonable assumptions, differential privacy [13] and related notions of privacy [18, 19]
imply good generalization. However, a precise account of the connection between overfitting and the risk
posed by different types of attack remains unknown.
∗This is the unabridged version of the paper accepted for publication in CSF 2018.
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A second factor identified as relevant to privacy risk is influence [5], a quantity that arises often in the
study of Boolean functions [20]. Influence measures the extent to which a particular input to a function is
able to cause changes to its output. In the context of machine learning privacy, the influential features of a
model may give an active attacker the ability to extract information by observing the changes they cause.
In this paper, we characterize the effect that overfitting and influence have on the advantage of adversaries
who attempt to infer specific facts about the data used to train machine learning models. We formalize
quantitative advantage measures that capture the privacy risk to training data posed by two types of attack,
namely membership inference [6, 7] and attribute inference [3, 4, 5, 8]. For each type of attack, we analyze
the advantage in terms of generalization error (overfitting) and influence for several concrete black-box
adversaries. While our analysis necessarily makes formal assumptions about the learning setting, we show
that our analytic results hold on several real-world datasets by controlling for overfitting through regularization
and model structure.
Membership inference Training data membership inference attacks aim to determine whether a given
data point was present in the training data used to build a model. Although this may not at first seem
to pose a serious privacy risk, the threat is clear in settings such as health analytics where the distinction
between case and control groups could reveal an individual’s sensitive conditions. This type of attack has
been extensively studied in the adjacent area of genomics [21,22], and more recently in the context of machine
learning [6, 7].
Our analysis shows a clear dependence of membership advantage on generalization error (Section 3.2),
and in some cases the relationship is directly proportional (Theorem 2). Our experiments on real data
confirm that this connection matters in practice (Section 6.2), even for models that do not conform to the
formal assumptions of our analysis. In one set of experiments, we apply a particularly straightforward attack
to deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) using several datasets examined in prior work on membership
inference. Despite requiring significantly less computation and adversarial background knowledge, our attack
performs almost as well as a recently published attack [7].
Our results illustrate that overfitting is a sufficient condition for membership vulnerability in popular
machine learning algorithms. However, it is not a necessary condition (Theorem 4). In fact, under certain
assumptions that are commonly satisfied in practice, we show that a stable training algorithm (i.e., one that
does not overfit) can be subverted so that the resulting model is nearly as stable but reveals exact membership
information through its black-box behavior. This attack is suggestive of algorithm substitution attacks from
cryptography [23] and makes adversarial assumptions similar to those of other recent ML privacy attacks [24].
We implement this construction to train deep CNNs (Section 6.4) and observe that, regardless of the model’s
generalization behavior, the attacker can recover membership information while incurring very little penalty
to predictive accuracy.
Attribute inference In an attribute inference attack, the adversary uses a machine learning model and
incomplete information about a data point to infer the missing information for that point. For example, in
work by Fredrikson et al. [4], the adversary is given partial information about an individual’s medical record
and attempts to infer the individual’s genotype by using a model trained on similar medical records.
We formally characterize the advantage of an attribute inference adversary as its ability to infer a target
feature given an incomplete point from the training data, relative to its ability to do so for points from the
general population (Section 4). This approach is distinct from the way that attribute advantage has largely
been characterized in prior work [3, 4, 5], which prioritized empirically measuring advantage relative to a
simulator who is not given access to the model. We offer an alternative definition of attribute advantage
(Definition 6) that corresponds to this characterization and argue that it does not isolate the risk that the
model poses specifically to individuals in the training data.
Our formal analysis shows that attribute inference, like membership inference, is indeed sensitive to
overfitting. However, we find that influence must be factored in as well to understand when overfitting will
lead to privacy risk (Section 4.1). Interestingly, the risk to individuals in the training data is greatest when
these two factors are “in balance”. Regardless of how large the generalization error becomes, the attacker’s
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ability to learn more about the training data than the general population vanishes as influence increases.
Connection between membership and attribute inference The two types of attack that we examine
are deeply related. We build reductions between the two by assuming oracle access to either type of adversary.
Then, we characterize each reduction’s advantage in terms of the oracle’s assumed advantage. Our results
suggest that attribute inference may be “harder” than membership inference: attribute advantage implies
membership advantage (Theorem 6), but there is currently no similar result in the opposite direction.
Our reductions are not merely of theoretical interest. Rather, they function as practical attacks as well.
We implemented a reduction for attribute inference and evaluated it on real data (Section 6.3). Our results
show that when generalization error is high, the reduction adversary can outperform an attribute inference
attack given in [4] by a significant margin.
Summary This paper explores the relationships between privacy, overfitting, and influence in machine
learning models. We present new formalizations of membership and attribute inference attacks that enable
an analysis of the privacy risk that black-box variants of these attacks pose to individuals in the training data.
We give analytic quantities for the attacker’s performance in terms of generalization error and influence, which
allow us to conclude that certain configurations imply privacy risk. By introducing a new type of membership
inference attack in which a stable training algorithm is replaced by a malicious variant, we find that the
converse does not hold: machine learning models can pose immediate threats to privacy without overfitting.
Finally, we study the underlying connections between membership and attribute inference attacks, finding
surprising relationships that give insight into the relative difficulty of the attacks and lead to new attacks
that work well on real data.
2 Background
Throughout the paper we focus on privacy risks related to machine learning algorithms. We begin by
introducing basic notation and concepts from learning theory.
2.1 Notation and preliminaries
Let z = (x, y) ∈ X×Y be a data point, where x represents a set of features or attributes and y a response.
In a typical machine learning setting, and thus throughout this paper, it is assumed that the features x are
given as input to the model, and the response y is returned. Let D represent a distribution of data points,
and let S ∼ Dn be an ordered list of n points, which we will refer to as a dataset, training set, or training data
interchangeably, sampled i.i.d. from D. We will frequently make use of the following methods of sampling a
data point z:
• z ∼ S: i is picked uniformly at random from [n], and z is set equal to the i-th element of S.
• z ∼ D: z is chosen according to the distribution D.
When it is clear from the context, we will refer to these sampling methods as sampling from the dataset and
sampling from the distribution, respectively.
Unless stated otherwise, our results pertain to the standard machine learning setting, wherein a model
AS is obtained by applying a machine learning algorithm A to a dataset S. Models reside in the set X→ Y
and are assumed to approximately minimize the expected value of a loss function ` over S. If z = (x, y), the
loss function `(AS , z) measures how much AS(x) differs from y. When the response domain is discrete, it is
common to use the 0-1 loss function, which satisfies `(AS , z) = 0 if y = AS(x) and `(AS , z) = 1 otherwise.
When the response is continuous, we use the squared-error loss `(AS , z) = (y − AS(x))2. Additionally, it
is common for many types of models to assume that y is normally distributed in some way. For example,
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linear regression assumes that y is normally distributed given x [25]. To analyze these cases, we use the error
function erf, which is defined in Equation 1.
erf(x) =
1√
pi
∫ x
−x
e−t
2
dt (1)
Intuitively, if a random variable  is normally distributed and x ≥ 0, then erf(x/√2) represents the probability
that  is within x standard deviations of the mean.
2.2 Stability and generalization
An algorithm is stable if a small change to its input causes limited change in its output. In the context
of machine learning, the algorithm in question is typically a training algorithm A, and the “small change”
corresponds to the replacement of a single data point in S. This is made precise in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (On-Average-Replace-One (ARO) Stability). Given S = (z1, . . . , zn) ∼ Dn and an additional
point z′ ∼ D, define S(i) = (z1, . . . , zi−1, z′, zi+1, . . . , zn). Let stable : N → R be a monotonically decreasing
function. Then a training algorithm A is on-average-replace-one-stable (or ARO-stable) on loss function `
with rate stable(n) if
E
S∼Dn,z′∼D
i∼U(n),A
[`(AS(i) , zi)− `(AS , zi)] ≤ stable(n),
where A in the expectation refers to the randomness used by the training algorithm.
Stability is closely related to the popular notion of differential privacy [26] given in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Differential privacy). An algorithm A : Xn → Y satisfies -differential privacy if for all
S, S′ ∈ Xn that differ in the value at a single index i ∈ [n] and all Y ⊆ Y, the following holds:
Pr[A(S) ∈ Y ] ≤ e Pr[A(S′) ∈ Y ].
When a learning algorithm is not stable, the models that it produces might overfit to the training data.
Overfitting is characterized by large generalization error, which is defined below.
Definition 3 (Average generalization error). The average generalization error of a machine learning algo-
rithm A on D is defined as
Rgen(A,n,D, `) = E
S∼Dn
z∼D
[`(AS , z)]− E
S∼Dn
z∼S
[`(AS , z)].
In other words, AS overfits if its expected loss on samples drawn from D is much greater than its
expected loss on its training set. For brevity, when n, D, and ` are unambiguous from the context, we will
write Rgen(A) instead.
It is important to note that Definition 3 describes the average generalization error over all training sets, as
contrasted with another common definition of generalization error Ez∼D[`(AS , z)]− 1n
∑
z∈S `(AS , z), which
holds the training set fixed. The connection between average generalization and stability is formalized by
Shalev-Shwartz et al. [27], who show that an algorithm’s ability to achieve a given generalization error (as a
function of n) is equivalent to its ARO-stability rate.
3 Membership Inference Attacks
In a membership inference attack, the adversary attempts to infer whether a specific point was included in
the dataset used to train a given model. The adversary is given a data point z = (x, y), access to a model
AS , the size of the model’s training set |S| = n, and the distribution D that the training set was drawn from.
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With this information the adversary must decide whether z ∈ S. For the purposes of this discussion, we do
not distinguish whether the adversary A’s access to AS is “black-box”, i.e., consisting only of input/output
queries, or “white-box”, i.e., involving the internal structure of the model itself. However, all of the attacks
presented in this section assume black-box access.
Experiment 1 below formalizes membership inference attacks. The experiment first samples a fresh
dataset from D and then flips a coin b to decide whether to draw the adversary’s challenge point z from the
training set or the original distribution. A is then given the challenge, along with the additional information
described above, and must guess the value of b.
Experiment 1 (Membership experiment ExpM(A, A, n,D)). Let A be an adversary, A be a learning algo-
rithm, n be a positive integer, and D be a distribution over data points (x, y). The membership experiment
proceeds as follows:
1. Sample S ∼ Dn, and let AS = A(S).
2. Choose b← {0, 1} uniformly at random.
3. Draw z ∼ S if b = 0, or z ∼ D if b = 1
4. ExpM(A, A, n,D) is 1 if A(z,AS , n,D) = b and 0 otherwise. A must output either 0 or 1.
Definition 4 (Membership advantage). The membership advantage of A is defined as
AdvM(A, A, n,D) = 2 Pr[ExpM(A, A, n,D) = 1]− 1,
where the probabilities are taken over the coin flips of A, the random choices of S and b, and the random
data point z ∼ S or z ∼ D.
Equivalently, the right-hand side can be expressed as the difference between A’s true and false positive
rates
AdvM = Pr[A = 0 | b = 0]− Pr[A = 0 | b = 1], (2)
where AdvM is a shortcut for AdvM(A, A, n,D).
Using Experiment 1, Definition 4 gives an advantage measure that characterizes how well an adversary
can distinguish between z ∼ S and z ∼ D after being given the model. This is slightly different from the
sort of membership inference described in some prior work [6, 7], which distinguishes between z ∼ S and
z ∼ D \ S. We are interested in measuring the degree to which AS reveals membership to A, and not in
the degree to which any background knowledge of S or D does. If we sample z from D \ S instead of D,
the adversary could gain advantage by noting which data points are more likely to have been sampled into
S ∼ Dn. This does not reflect how leaky the model is, and Definition 4 rules it out.
In fact, the only way to gain advantage is through access to the model. In the membership experiment
ExpM(A, A, n,D), the adversary A must determine the value of b by using z, AS , n, and D. Of these inputs,
n and D do not depend on b, and we have the following for all z:
Pr[b = 0 | z] = Pr
S∼Dn
z∼S
[z] Pr[b = 0]/Pr[z] = Pr
z∼D
[z] Pr[b = 1]/Pr[z] = Pr[b = 1 | z].
We note that Definition 4 does not give the adversary credit for predicting that a point drawn from D (i.e.,
when b = 1), which also happens to be in S, is a member of S. As a result, the maximum advantage that
an adversary can hope to achieve is 1 − µ(n,D), where µ(n,D) = PrS∼Dn,z∼D[z ∈ S] is the probability of
re-sampling an individual from the training set into the general population. In real settings µ(n,D) is likely
to be exceedingly small, so this is not an issue in practice.
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3.1 Bounds from differential privacy
Our first result (Theorem 1) bounds the advantage of an adversary who attempts a membership attack on a
differentially private model [26]. Differential privacy imposes strict limits on the degree to which any point in
the training data can affect the outcome of a computation, and it is commonly understood that differential
privacy will limit membership inference attacks. Thus it is not surprising that the advantage is limited by a
function of .
Theorem 1. Let A be an -differentially private learning algorithm and A be a membership adversary. Then
we have:
AdvM(A, A, n,D) ≤ e − 1.
Proof. Given S = (z1, . . . , zn) ∼ Dn and an additional point z′ ∼ D, define S(i) = (z1, . . . , zi−1, z′, zi+1, . . . , zn).
Then, A(z′, AS , n,D) and A(zi, AS(i) , n,D) have identical distributions for all i ∈ [n], so we can write:
Pr[A = 0 | b = 0] = 1− E
S∼Dn
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
A(zi, AS , n,D)
]
Pr[A = 0 | b = 1] = 1− E
S∼Dn
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
A(zi, AS(i) , n,D)
]
The above two equalities, combined with Equation 2, gives:
AdvM = E
S∼Dn
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
A(zi, AS(i) , n,D)−A(zi, AS , n,D)
]
(3)
Without loss of generality for the case where models reside in an infinite domain, assume that the models
produced by A come from the set {A1, . . . , Ak}. Differential privacy guarantees that for all j ∈ [k],
Pr[AS(i) = A
j ] ≤ e Pr[AS = Aj ].
Using this inequality, we can rewrite and bound the right-hand side of Equation 3 as
k∑
j=1
E
S∼Dn
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr[AS(i) = A
j ]− Pr[AS = Aj ] · A(zi, Aj , n,D)
]
≤
k∑
j=1
E
S∼Dn
[
(e − 1) Pr[AS = Aj ] · 1
n
n∑
i=1
A(zi, Aj , n,D)
]
,
which is at most e − 1 since A(z,Aj , n,D) ≤ 1 for any z, Aj , n, and D.
Wu et al. [8, Section 3.2] present an algorithm that is differentially private as long as the loss function `
is λ-strongly convex and ρ-Lipschitz. Moreover, they prove that the performance of the resulting model is
close to the optimal. Combined with Theorem 1, this provides us with a bound on membership advantage
when the loss function is strongly convex and Lipschitz.
3.2 Membership attacks and generalization
In this section, we consider several membership attacks that make few, common assumptions about the
model AS or the distribution D. Importantly, these assumptions are consistent with many natural learning
techniques widely used in practice.
For each attack, we express the advantage of the attacker as a function of the extent of the overfitting,
thereby showing that the generalization behavior of the model is a strong predictor for vulnerability to
membership inference attacks. In Section 6.2, we demonstrate that these relationships often hold in practice
on real data, even when the assumptions used in our analysis do not hold.
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Bounded loss function We begin with a straightforward attack that makes only one simple assumption:
the loss function is bounded by some constant B. Then, with probability proportional to the model’s loss
at the query point z, the adversary predicts that z is not in the training set. The attack is formalized in
Adversary 1.
Adversary 1 (Bounded loss function). Suppose `(AS , z) ≤ B for some constant B, all S ∼ Dn, and all z
sampled from S or D. Then, on input z = (x, y), AS, n, and D, the membership adversary A proceeds as
follows:
1. Query the model to get AS(x).
2. Output 1 with probability `(AS , z)/B. Else, output 0.
Theorem 2 states that the membership advantage of this approach is proportional to the generalization
error of A, showing that advantage and generalization error are closely related in many common learning
settings. In particular, classification settings, where the 0-1 loss function is commonly used, B = 1 yields
membership advantage equal to the generalization error. Simply put, high generalization error necessarily
results in privacy loss for classification models.
Theorem 2. The advantage of Adversary 1 is Rgen(A)/B.
Proof. The proof is as follows:
AdvM(A, A, n,D)
= Pr[A = 0 | b = 0]− Pr[A = 0 | b = 1]
= Pr[A = 1 | b = 1]− Pr[A = 1 | b = 0]
= E
[
`(AS , z)
B
∣∣∣∣b = 1]− E [`(AS , z)B
∣∣∣∣b = 0]
=
1
B
 E
S∼Dn
z∼D
[`(AS , z)]− E
S∼Dn
z∼S
[`(AS , z)]

= Rgen(A)/B
Gaussian error Whenever the adversary knows the exact error distribution, it can simply compute which
value of b is more likely given the error of the model on z. This adversary is described formally in Adversary 2.
While it may seem far-fetched to assume that the adversary knows the exact error distribution, linear
regression models implicitly assume that the error of the model is normally distributed. In addition, the
standard errors σS , σD of the model on S and D, respectively, are often published with the model, giving
the adversary full knowledge of the error distribution. We will describe in Section 3.3 how the adversary can
proceed if it does not know one or both of these values.
Adversary 2 (Threshold). Suppose f( | b = 0) and f( | b = 1), the conditional probability density
functions of the error, are known in advance. Then, on input z = (x, y), AS, n, and D, the membership
adversary A proceeds as follows:
1. Query the model to get AS(x).
2. Let  = y −AS(x). Output arg maxb∈{0,1} f( | b).
In regression problems that use squared-error loss, the magnitude of the generalization error depends on
the scale of the response y. For this reason, in the following we use the ratio σD/σS to measure generalization
error. Theorem 3 characterizes the advantage of this adversary in the case of Gaussian error in terms of
σD/σS . As one might expect, this advantage is 0 when σS = σD and approaches 1 as σD/σS → ∞. The
dotted line in Figure 2a shows the graph of the advantage as a function of σD/σS .
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Theorem 3. Suppose σS and σD are known in advance such that  ∼ N(0, σ2S) when b = 0 and  ∼ N(0, σ2D)
when b = 1. Then, the advantage of Membership Adversary 2 is
erf
(
σD
σS
√
ln(σD/σS)
(σD/σS)2 − 1
)
− erf
(√
ln(σD/σS)
(σD/σS)2 − 1
)
.
Proof. We have
f( | b = 0) = 1√
2piσS
e−
2/2σ2S
f( | b = 1) = 1√
2piσD
e−
2/2σ2D .
Let ±eq be the points at which these two probability density functions are equal. Some algebraic manipu-
lation shows that
eq = σD
√
2 ln(σD/σS)
(σD/σS)2 − 1 . (4)
Moreover, if σS < σD, f( | b = 0) > f( | b = 1) if and only if || < eq. Therefore, the membership
advantage is
AdvM(A, A, n,D)
= Pr[A = 0 | b = 0]− Pr[A = 0 | b = 1]
= Pr[|| < eq | b = 0]− Pr[|| < eq | b = 1]
= erf
(
eq√
2σS
)
− erf
(
eq√
2σD
)
= erf
(
σD
σS
√
ln(σD/σS)
(σD/σS)2 − 1
)
− erf
(√
ln(σD/σS)
(σD/σS)2 − 1
)
.
3.3 Unknown standard error
In practice, models are often published with just one value of standard error, so the adversary often does
not know how σD compares to σS . One solution to this issue is to assume that σS ≈ σD, i.e., that the model
does not terribly overfit. Then, the threshold is set at || = σS , which is the limit of the right-hand side
of Equation 4 as σD approaches σS . Then, the membership advantage is erf(1/
√
2) − erf(σS/
√
2σD). This
expression is graphed in Figure 2b as a function of σD/σS .
Alternatively, if the adversary knows which machine learning algorithm was used, it can repeatedly
sample S ∼ Dn, train the model AS using the sampled S, and measure the error of the model to arrive at
reasonably close approximations of σS and σD.
3.4 Other sources of membership advantage
The results in the preceding sections show that overfitting is sufficient for membership advantage. However,
models can leak information about the training set in other ways, and thus overfitting is not necessary for
membership advantage. For example, the learning rule can produce models that simply output a lossless
encoding of the training dataset. This example may seem unconvincing for several reasons: the leakage is
obvious, and the “encoded” dataset may not function well as a model. In the rest of this section, we present
a pair of colluding training algorithm and adversary that does not have the above issues but still allows the
attacker to learn the training set almost perfectly. This is in the framework of an algorithm substitution
attack (ASA) [23], where the target algorithm, which is implemented by closed-source software, is subverted
to allow a colluding adversary to violate the privacy of the users of the algorithm. All the while, this
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subversion remains impossible to detect. Algorithm 1 and Adversary 3 represent a similar security threat
for learning rules with bounded loss function. While the attack presented here is not impossible to detect,
on points drawn from D, the black-box behavior of the subverted model is similar to that of an unsubverted
model.
The main result is given in Theorem 4, which shows that any ARO-stable learning rule A, with a bounded
loss function operating on a finite domain, can be modified into a vulnerable learning rule Ak, where k ∈ N is
a parameter. Moreover, subject to our assumption from before that µ(n,D) is very small, the stability rate
of the vulnerable model Ak is not far from that of A, and for each Ak there exists a membership adversary
whose advantage is negligibly far (in k) from the maximum advantage possible on D. Simply put, it is often
possible to find a suitably leaky version of an ARO-stable learning rule whose generalization behavior is close
to that of the original.
Theorem 4. Let d = log |X|, m = log |Y|, ` be a loss function bounded by some constant B, A be an ARO-
stable learning rule with rate stable(n), and suppose that x uniquely determines the point (x, y) in D. Then for
any integer k > 0, there exists an ARO-stable learning rule Ak with rate at most stable(n)+knB2
−d+µ(n,D)
and adversary A such that:
AdvM(A, Ak, n,D) = 1− µ(n,D)− 2−mk
The proof of Theorem 4 involves constructing a learning rule Ak that leaks precise membership informa-
tion when queried in a particular way but is otherwise identical to A. Ak assumes that the adversary has
knowledge of a secret key that is used to select pseudorandom functions that define the “special” queries
used to extract membership information. In this way, the normal behavior of the model remains largely
unchanged, making Ak approximately as stable as A, but the learning algorithm and adversary “collude” to
leak information through the model. We require the features x to fully determine y to avoid collisions when
the adversary queries the model, which would result in false positives. In practice, many learning problems
satisfy this criterion. Algorithm 1 and Adversary 3 illustrate the key ideas in this construction informally.
Algorithm 1 (Colluding training algorithm AC). Let FK : X 7→ X and GK : X 7→ Y be keyed pseudorandom
functions, K1, . . . ,Kk be uniformly chosen keys, and A be a training algorithm. On receiving a training set
S, AC proceeds as follows:
1. Supplement S using F,G: for all (xi, yi) ∈ S and j ∈ [k], let z′i,j = (FKj (xi), GKj (xi)), and set
S′ = S ∪ {z′i,j | i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k]}.
2. Return AS′ = A(S
′).
Adversary 3 (Colluding adversary AC). Let FK : X 7→ X, GK : X 7→ Y and K1, . . . ,Kk be the functions
and keys used by AC, and AS′ be the product of training with A
C with those keys. On input z = (x, y), the
adversary AC proceeds as follows:
1. For j ∈ [k], let y′j ← AS′(FKj (x)).
2. Output 0 if y′j = GKj (x) for all j ∈ [k]. Else, output 1.
Algorithm 1 will not work well in practice for many classes of models, as they may not have the capacity
to store the membership information needed by the adversary while maintaining the ability to generalize.
Interestingly, in Section 6.4 we empirically demonstrate that deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) do
in fact have this capacity and generalize perfectly well when trained in the manner of AC. As pointed out by
Zhang et al. [28], because the number of parameters in deep CNNs often significantly exceeds the training
set size, despite their remarkably good generalization error, deep CNNs may have the capacity to effectively
“memorize” the dataset. Our results supplement their observations and suggest that this phenomenon may
have severe implications for privacy.
Before we give the formal proof, we note a key difference between Algorithm 1 and the construction used
in the proof. Whereas the model returned by Algorithm 1 belongs to the same class as those produced by A,
in the formal proof the training algorithm can return an arbitrary model as long as its black-box behavior
is suitable.
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Proof. The proof constructs a learning algorithm and adversary who share a set of k keys to a pseudorandom
function. The secrecy of the shared key is unnecessary, as the proof only relies on the uniformity of the keys
and the pseudorandom functions’ outputs. The primary concern is with using the pseudorandom function
in a way that preserves the stability of A as much as possible.
Without loss of generality, assume that X = {0, 1}d and Y = {0, 1}m. Let FK : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d and
GK : {0, 1}d 7→ {0, 1}m be keyed pseudorandom functions, and let K1, . . . ,Kk be uniformly sampled keys.
On receiving S, the training algorithm AK1,...,Kk returns the following model:
AK1,...,KkS (x) =
{
GKj (x), if ∃(x′, y) ∈ S s.t. x = FKj (x′) for some Kj
AS(x), otherwise
We now define a membership adversary AK1,...,Kk who is hard-wired with keys K1, . . . ,Kk:
AK1,...,Kk(z,A, n,D) =
{
0, if AS(x) = GKj (FKj (x))for all Kj
1, otherwise
Recalling our assumption that the value of x uniquely determines the point (x, y), we can derive the advantage
of AK1,...,Kk on the corresponding trainer AK1,...,Kk in possession of the same keys:
AdvM(AK1,...,Kk , AK1,...,Kk , n,D)
= Pr[AK1,...,Kk = 0 | b = 0]− Pr[AK1,...,Kk = 0 | b = 1]
= 1− µ(n,D)− 2−mk
The 2−mk term comes from the possibility that GKj (FKj (x)) = AS(x) for all j ∈ [k] by pure chance.
Now observe that A is ARO-stable with rate stable(n). If z = (x, y), we use CS(z) to denote the
probability that FKj (x) collides with FKj (xi) for some (xi, yi) = zi ∈ S and some key Kj . Note that by a
simple union bound, we have CS(z) ≤ kn2−d for z 6∈ S. Then algebraic manipulation gives us the following,
where we write AKS in place of A
K1,...,Kk
S to simplify notation:
Rgen(A
K , n,D, `)
= E
S∼Dn
z′∼D
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(AKS(i) , zi)− `(AKS , zi)
]
= E
S∼Dn
z′∼D
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− CS(zi)) (`(AS(i) , zi)− `(AS , zi))
]
+ E
S∼Dn
z′∼D
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
CS(zi) (`(AS(i) , zi)− `(GK , zi))
]
= E
S∼Dn
z′∼D
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(AS(i) , zi)− `(AS , zi)
]
+ E
S∼Dn
z′∼D
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
CS(zi) (`(AS , zi)− `(GK , zi))
]
≤ E
S∼Dn
z′∼D
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(AS(i) , zi)− `(AS , zi)
]
+ knB2−d + µ(n,D)
= stable(n) + knB2
−d + µ(n,D)
Note that the term µ(n,D) on the last line accounts for the possibility that the z′ sampled at index i in S(i)
is already in S, which results in a collision. By the result in [27] that states that the average generalization
error equals the ARO-stability rate, AK is ARO-stable with rate stable(n) + knB2
−d + µ(n,D), completing
the proof.
The formal study of ASAs was introduced by Bellare et al. [23], who considered attacks against symmetric
encryption. Subsequently, attacks against other cryptographic primitives were studied as well [29, 30, 31].
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The recent work of Song et al. [24] considers a similar setting, wherein a malicious machine learning provider
supplies a closed-source training algorithm to users with private data. When the provider gets access to the
resulting model, it can exploit the trapdoors introduced in the model to get information about the private
training dataset. However, to the best of our knowledge, a formal treatment of ASAs against machine
learning algorithms has not been given yet. We leave this line of research as future work, with Theorem 4
as a starting point.
4 Attribute Inference Attacks
We now consider attribute inference attacks, where the goal of the adversary is to guess the value of the
sensitive features of a data point given only some public knowledge about it and the model. To make
this explicit in our notation, in this section we assume that data points are triples z = (v, t, y), where
(v, t) = x ∈ X and t is the sensitive features targeted in the attack. A fixed function ϕ with domain X×Y
describes the information about data points known by the adversary. Let T be the support of t when
z = (v, t, y) ∼ D. The function pi is the projection of X into T (e.g., pi(z) = t).
Attribute inference is formalized in Experiment 2, which proceeds much like Experiment 1. An important
difference is that the adversary is only given partial information ϕ(z) about the challenge point z.
Experiment 2 (Attribute experiment ExpA(A, A, n,D)). Let A be an adversary, n be a positive integer,
and D be a distribution over data points (x, y). The attribute experiment proceeds as follows:
1. Sample S ∼ Dn.
2. Choose b← {0, 1} uniformly at random.
3. Draw z ∼ S if b = 0, or z ∼ D if b = 1.
4. ExpA(A, A, n,D) is 1 if A(ϕ(z), AS , n,D) = pi(z) and 0 otherwise.
In the corresponding advantage measure shown in Definition 5, our goal is to measure the amount of
information about the target pi(z) that AS leaks specifically concerning the training data S. Definition 5
accomplishes this by comparing the performance of the adversary when b = 0 in Experiment 2 with that
when b = 1.
Definition 5 (Attribute advantage). The attribute advantage of A is defined as:
AdvA(A, A, n,D) = Pr[ExpA(A, A, n,D) = 1 | b = 0]− Pr[ExpA(A, A, n,D) = 1 | b = 1],
where the probabilities are taken over the coin flips of A, the random choice of S, and the random data point
z ∼ S or z ∼ D.
Notice that
AdvA =
∑
ti∈T Prz∼D[t = ti](Pr[A = ti | b = 0, t = ti]− Pr[A = ti | b = 1, t = ti]), (5)
where A and AdvA are shortcuts for A(ϕ(z), AS , n,D) and AdvA(A, A, n,D), respectively.
This definition has the side effect of incentivizing the adversary to “game the system” by performing
poorly when it thinks that b = 1. To remove this incentive, one may consider using a simulator S, which
does not receive the model as an input, when b = 1. This definition is formalized below:
Definition 6 (Alternative attribute advantage). Let
S(ϕ(z), n,D) = arg max
ti
Pr
z∼D
[pi(z) = ti | ϕ(z)]
be the Bayes optimal simulator. The attribute advantage of A can alternatively be defined as
AdvAS(A, A, n,D) = Pr[A(ϕ(z), AS , n,D) = pi(z) | b = 0]− Pr[S(ϕ(z), n,D) = pi(z) | b = 1].
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One potential issue with this alternative definition is that higher model accuracy will lead to higher
attribute advantage regardless of how accurate the model is for the general population. Broadly, there are
two ways for a model to perform better on the training data: it can overfit to the training data, or it
can learn a general trend in the distribution D. In this paper, we concern ourselves with the view that
the adversary’s ability to infer the target pi(z) in the latter case is due not to the model but pre-existing
patterns in D. To allow capturing the difference between overfitting and learning a general trend, we use
Definition 5 in the following analysis and leave a more complete exploration of Definition 6 as future work.
While adversaries that “game the system” may seem problematic, the effectiveness of such adversaries is
indicative of privacy loss because their existence implies the ability to infer membership, as demonstrated
by Reduction Adversary 5 in Section 5.1.
4.1 Inversion, generalization, and influence
The case where ϕ simply removes the sensitive attribute t from the data point z = (v, t, y) such that
ϕ(z) = (v, y) is known in the literature as model inversion [3, 4, 5, 8].
In this section, we look at the model inversion attack of Fredrikson et al. [4] under the advantage given
in Definition 5. We point out that this is a novel analysis, as this advantage is defined to reflect the extent
to which an attribute inference attack reveals information about individuals in S. While prior work [3, 4]
has empirically evaluated attribute accuracy over corresponding training and test sets, our goal is to analyze
the factors that lead to increased privacy risk specifically for members of the training data. To that end, we
illustrate the relationship between advantage and generalization error as we did in the case of membership
inference (Section 3.2). We also explore the role of feature influence, which in this case corresponds to the
degree to which changes to a sensitive feature of x affects the value AS(x). In Section 6.3, we show that the
formal relationships described here often extend to attacks on real data where formal assumptions may fail
to hold.
The attack described by Fredrikson et al. [4] is intended for linear regression models and is thus subject
to the Gaussian error assumption discussed in Section 3.2. In general, when the adversary can approximate
the error distribution reasonably well, e.g., by assuming a Gaussian distribution whose standard deviation
equals the published standard error value, it can gain advantage by trying all possible values of the sensitive
attribute. We denote the adversary’s approximation of the error distribution by fA, and we assume that
the target t = pi(z) is drawn from a finite set of possible values t1, . . . , tm with known frequencies in D. We
indicate the other features, which are known by the adversary, with the letter v (i.e., z = (x, y), x = (v, t),
and ϕ(z) = (v, y)). The attack is shown in Adversary 4. For each ti, the adversary counterfactually assumes
that t = ti and computes what the error of the model would be. It then uses this information to update the
a priori marginal distribution of t and picks the value ti with the greatest likelihood.
Adversary 4 (General). Let fA() be the adversary’s guess for the probability density of the error  =
y −AS(x). On input v, y, AS, n, and D, the adversary proceeds as follows:
1. Query the model to get AS(v, ti) for all i ∈ [m].
2. Let (ti) = y −AS(v, ti).
3. Return the result of arg maxti(Prz∼D[t = ti] · fA((ti))).
When analyzing Adversary 4, we are clearly interested in the effect that generalization error will have
on advantage. Given the results of Section 3.2, we can reasonably expect that large generalization error will
lead to greater advantage. However, as pointed out by Wu et al. [5], the functional relationship between
t and AS(v, t) may play a role as well. Working in the context of models as Boolean functions, Wu et al.
formalized the relevant property as functional influence [20], which is the probability that changing t will
cause AS(v, t) to change when v is sampled uniformly.
The attack considered here applies to linear regression models, and Boolean influence is not suitable for
use in this setting. However, an analogous notion of influence that characterizes the magnitude of change to
AS(v, t) is relevant to attribute inference. For linear models, this corresponds to the absolute value of the
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normalized coefficient of t. Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to this quantity as the influence of t
without risk of confusion with the Boolean influence used in other contexts.
Binary Variable with Uniform Prior The first part of our analysis deals with the simplest case where
m = 2 with Prz∼D[t = t1] = Prz∼D[t = t2]. Without loss of generality we assume that AS(v, t1) =
AS(v, t2) + τ for some fixed τ ≥ 0, so in this setting τ is a straightforward proxy for influence. Theorem 5
relates the advantage of Adversary 4 to σS , σD, and τ .
Theorem 5. Let t be drawn uniformly from {t1, t2} and suppose that y = AS(v, t) + , where  ∼ N(0, σ2S)
if b = 0 and  ∼ N(0, σ2D) if b = 1. Then the advantage of Adversary 4 is 12 (erf(τ/2
√
2σS)− erf(τ/2
√
2σD)).
Proof. Given the assumptions made in this setting, we can describe the behavior of A as returning the value
ti that minimizes |(ti)|. If t = t1, it is easy to check that A guesses correctly if and only if (t1) > −τ/2.
This means that A’s advantage given t = t1 is
Pr[A = t1 | t = t1, b = 0]− Pr[A = t1 | t = t1, b = 1]
= Pr[(t1) > −τ/2 | b = 0]− Pr[(t1) > −τ/2 | b = 1]
=
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
τ
2
√
2σS
))
−
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
τ
2
√
2σD
))
=
1
2
(
erf
(
τ
2
√
2σS
)
− erf
(
τ
2
√
2σD
)) (6)
Similar reasoning shows that A’s advantage given t = t2 is exactly the same, so the theorem follows from
Equation 5.
Clearly, the advantage will be zero when there is no generalization error (σS = σD). Consider the other
extreme case where σS → 0 and σD →∞. When σS is very small, the adversary will always guess correctly
because the influence of t overwhelms the effect of the error . On the other hand, when σD is very large,
changes to t will be nearly imperceptible for “normal” values of τ , and the adversary is reduced to random
guessing. Therefore, the maximum possible advantage with uniform prior is 1/2. As a model overfits more,
σS decreases and σD tends to increase. If τ remains fixed, it is easy to see that the advantage increases
monotonically under these circumstances.
Figure 1 shows the effect of changing τ as the ratio σD/σS remains fixed at several different constants.
When τ = 0, t does not have any effect on the output of the model, so the adversary does not gain anything
from having access to the model and is reduced to random guessing. When τ is large, the adversary almost
always guesses correctly regardless of the value of b since the influence of t drowns out the error noise. Thus,
at both extremes the advantage approaches 0, and the adversary is able to gain advantage only when τ and
σD/σS are in balance.
General Case Sometimes the uniform prior for t may not be realistic. For example, t may represent
whether a patient has a rare disease. In this case, we weight the values of fA((ti)) by the a priori prob-
ability Prz∼D[t = ti] before comparing which ti is the most likely. With uniform prior, we could simplify
arg maxti fA((ti)) to arg minti |(ti)| regardless of the value of σ used for fA. On the other hand, the value
of σ matters when we multiply by Pr[t = ti]. Because the adversary is not given b, it makes an assumption
similar to that described in Section 3.2 and uses  ∼ N(0, σ2S).
Clearly σS = σD results in zero advantage. The maximum possible advantage is attained when σS → 0
and σD → ∞. Then, by similar reasoning as before, the adversary will always guess correctly when b = 0
and is reduced to random guessing when b = 1, resulting in an advantage of 1− 1m .
In general, the advantage can be computed using Equation 5. We first figure out when the adversary
outputs ti. When fA is a Gaussian, this is not computationally intensive as there is at most one decision
boundary between any two values ti and tj . Then, we convert the decision boundaries into probabilities by
using the error distributions  ∼ N(0, σ2S) and N(0, σ2D), respectively.
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Figure 1: The advantage of Adversary 4 as a function of t’s influence τ . Here t is a uniformly distributed
binary variable.
5 Connection between membership and attribute inference
In this section, we examine the underlying connections between membership and attribute inference attacks.
Our approach is based on reduction adversaries that have oracle access to one type of attack and attempt
to perform the other type of attack. We characterize the advantage of each reduction adversary in terms of
the advantage of its oracle. In Section 6.3, we implement the most sophisticated of the reduction adversaries
described here and show that on real data it performs remarkably well, often outperforming Attribute
Adversary 4 by large margins. We note that these reductions are specific to our choice of attribute advantage
given in Definition 5. Analyzing the connections between membership and attribute inference using the
alternative Definition 6 is an interesting direction for future work.
5.1 From membership to attribute
We start with an adversary AM→A that uses an attribute oracle to accomplish membership inference. The
attack, shown in Adversary 5, is straightforward: given a point z, the adversary queries the attribute oracle
to obtain a prediction t of the target value pi(z). If this prediction is correct, then the adversary concludes
that z was in the training data.
Adversary 5 (Membership → attribute). The reduction adversary AM→A has oracle access to attribute
adversary AA. On input z, AS, n, and D, the reduction adversary proceeds as follows:
1. Query the oracle to get t← AA(ϕ(z), AS , n,D).
2. Output 0 if pi(z) = t. Otherwise, output 1.
Theorem 6 shows that the membership advantage of this reduction exactly corresponds to the attribute
advantage of its oracle. In other words, the ability to effectively infer attributes of individuals in the training
set implies the ability to infer membership in the training set as well. This suggests that attribute inference
is at least as difficult as than membership inference.
Theorem 6. Let AM→A be the adversary described in Adversary 5, which uses AA as an oracle. Then,
AdvM(AM→A, A, n,D) = AdvA(AA, A, n,D).
Proof. The proof follows directly from the definitions of membership and attribute advantages.
AdvM = Pr[AM→A = 0 | b = 0]− Pr[AM→A = 0 | b = 1]
=
∑
ti∈T
Pr[t = ti](Pr[AM→A = 0 | b = 0, t = ti]− Pr[AM→A = 0 | b = 1, t = ti])
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=
∑
ti∈T
Pr[t = ti](Pr[AA = ti | b = 0, t = ti]− Pr[AA = ti | b = 1, t = ti])
= AdvA.
5.2 From attribute to membership
We now consider reductions in the other direction, wherein the adversary is given ϕ(z) and must reconstruct
the point z to query the membership oracle. To accomplish this, we assume that the adversary knows a
deterministic reconstruction function ϕ−1 such that ϕ◦ϕ−1 is the identity function, i.e., for any value of ϕ(z)
that the adversary may receive, there exists z′ = ϕ−1(ϕ(z)) such that ϕ(z) = ϕ(z′). However, because ϕ is
a lossy function, in general it does not hold that ϕ−1(ϕ(z)) = z. Our adversary, described in Adversary 6,
reconstructs the point z′, sets the attribute t of that point to value ti chosen uniformly at random, and
outputs ti if the membership oracle says that the resulting point is in the dataset.
Adversary 6 (Uniform attribute → membership). Suppose that t1, . . . , tm are the possible values of the
target t = pi(z). The reduction adversary AUA→M has oracle access to membership adversary AM. On input
ϕ(z), AS, n, and D, the reduction adversary proceeds as follows:
1. Choose ti uniformly at random from {t1, . . . , tm}.
2. Let z′ = ϕ−1(ϕ(z)), and change the value of the sensitive attribute t such that pi(z′) = ti.
3. Query AM to obtain b′ ← AM(z′, AS , n,D).
4. If b′ = 0, output ti. Otherwise, output ⊥.
The uniform choice of ti is motivated by the fact that the adversary may not know how the advantage
of the membership oracle is distributed across different values of t. For example, it is possible that AM
performs very poorly when t = t1 and that all of its advantage comes from the case where t = t2.
In the computation of the advantage, we only consider the case where pi(z) = ti because this is the only
case where the reduction adversary can possibly give the correct answer. In that case, the membership oracle
is given a challenge point from the distribution D′ = {(x, y) | (x, y) = ϕ−1(ϕ(z)) except that t = pi(z)},
where z ∼ S if b = 0 and z ∼ D if b = 1. On the other hand, the training set S used to train
the model AS was drawn from D. Because of this difference, we use modified membership advantage
AdvM∗ (A, A, n,D, ϕ, ϕ−1, pi), which measures the performance of the membership adversary when the chal-
lenge point is drawn from D′. In the case of a model inversion attack as described in the beginning of
Section 4.1, we have AdvM(A, A, n,D) = AdvM∗ (A, A, n,D, ϕ, ϕ−1, pi), i.e., the modified membership advan-
tage equals the unmodified one.
Theorem 7 shows that the attribute advantage of AUA→M is proportional to the modified membership
advantage of AM, giving a lower bound on the effectiveness of attribute inference attacks that use membership
oracles. Notably, the adversary does not make use of any associations that may exist between ϕ(z) and t,
so this reduction is general and works even when no such association exists. While the reduction does not
completely transfer the membership advantage to attribute advantage, the resulting attribute advantage is
within a constant factor of the modified membership advantage.
Theorem 7. Let AUA→M be the adversary described in Adversary 6, which uses AM as an oracle. Then,
AdvA(AUA→M, A, n,D) =
1
m
AdvM∗ (AM, A, n,D, ϕ, ϕ−1, pi).
Proof. We first give an informal argument. In order for AUA→M to correctly guess the value of t, it needs to
choose the correct ti, which happens with probability
1
m , and then AM(z′, AS , n,D) must be 0. Therefore,
AdvA = 1mAdv
M
∗ .
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Now we give the formal proof. Let t′ be the value of t that was chosen independently and uniformly at
random in Step 1 of Adversary 6. Since AUA→M outputs ti if and only if t′ = ti and AM(z′) = 0, we have
Pr[AUA→M = ti | b = 0, t = ti] =
1
m
Pr[AM(z′) = 0 | b = 0, t = ti],
and likewise when b = 1. Therefore, the advantage of the reduction adversary is
AdvA =
∑
ti∈T
Pr[t = ti](Pr[AUA→M = ti | b = 0, t = ti]− Pr[AUA→M = ti | b = 1, t = ti])
=
1
m
∑
ti∈T
Pr[t = ti](Pr[AM(z′) = 0 | b = 0, t = ti]− Pr[AM(z′) = 0 | b = 1, t = ti])
=
1
m
(Pr[AM(z′) = 0 | b = 0]− Pr[AM(z′) = 0 | b = 1])
=
1
m
AdvM∗ ,
where the second-to-last step holds due to the fact that b and t are independent.
Adversary 6 has the obvious weakness that it can only return correct answers when it guesses the value of
t correctly. Adversary 7 attempts to improve on this by making multiple queries to AM. Rather than guess
the value of t, this adversary tries all values of t in order of their marginal probabilities until the membership
adversary says “yes”.
Adversary 7 (Multi-query attribute → membership). Suppose that t1, . . . , tm are the possible values of the
sensitive attribute t. The reduction adversary AMA→M has oracle access to membership adversary AM. On
input ϕ(z), AS, n, and D, AA→M proceeds as follows:
1. Let z′ = ϕ−1(ϕ(z)).
2. For all i ∈ [m], let z′i be z′ with the value of the sensitive attribute t changed to ti.
3. Query AM to compute T = {ti | AM(z′i, AS , n,D) = 0}.
4. Output arg maxti∈T Prz∼D[t = ti]. If T = ∅, output ⊥.
We evaluate this adversary experimentally in Section 6.3.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the adversaries discussed in Sections 3, 4, and 5. We compare
the performance of these adversaries on real datasets with the analysis from previous sections and show that
overfitting predicts privacy risk in practice as our analysis suggests. Our experiments use linear regression,
tree, and deep convolutional neural network (CNN) models.
6.1 Methodology
6.1.1 Linear and tree models
We used the Python scikit-learn [32] library to calculate the empirical error Remp and the leave-one-out cross
validation error Rcv [33]. Because these two measures pertain to the error of the model on points inside
and outside the training set, respectively, they were used to approximate σS and σD, respectively. Then, we
made a random 75-25% split of the data into training and test sets. The training set was used to train either
a Ridge regression or a decision tree model, and then the adversaries were given access to this model. We
repeated this 100 times with different training-test splits and then averaged the result. Before we explain
the results, we describe the datasets.
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Eyedata. This is gene expression data from rat eye tissues [34], as presented in the “flare” package of
the R programming language. The inputs and the outputs are respectively stored in R as a 120×200 matrix
and a 120-dimensional vector of floating-point numbers. We used scikit-learn [32] to scale each attribute to
zero mean and unit variance.
IWPC. This is data collected by the International Warfarin Pharmacogenetics Consortium [35] about
patients who were prescribed warfarin. After we removed rows with missing values, 4819 patients remained
in the dataset. The inputs to the model are demographic (age, height, weight, race), medical (use of
amiodarone, use of enzyme inducer), and genetic (VKORC1, CYP2C9) attributes. Age, height, and weight
are real-valued and were scaled to zero mean and unit variance. The medical attributes take binary values,
and the remaining attributes were one-hot encoded. The output is the weekly dose of warfarin in milligrams.
However, because the distribution of warfarin dose is skewed, IWPC concludes in [35] that solving for the
square root of the dose results in a more predictive linear model. We followed this recommendation and
scaled the square root of the dose to zero mean and unit variance.
Netflix. We use the dataset from the Netflix Prize contest [36]. This is a sparse dataset that indicates
when and how a user rated a movie. For the output attribute, we used the rating of Dragon Ball Z: Trunks
Saga, which had one of the most polarized rating distributions. There are 2416 users who rated this, and
the ratings were scaled to zero mean and unit variance. The input attributes are binary variables indicating
whether or not a user rated each of the other 17,769 movies in the dataset.
6.1.2 Deep convolutional neural networks
We evaluated the membership inference attack on deep CNNs. In addition, we implemented the colluding
training algorithm (Algorithm 1) to verify its performance in practice. The CNNs were trained in Python
using the Keras deep-learning library [37] and a standard stochastic gradient descent algorithm [38]. We
used three datasets that are standard benchmarks in the deep learning literature and were evaluated in prior
work on inference attacks [7]; they are described in more detail below. For all datasets, pixel values were
normalized to the range [0, 1], and the label values were encoded as one-hot vectors. To expedite the training
process across a range of experimental configurations, we used a subset of each dataset. For each dataset,
we randomly divided the available data into equal-sized training and test sets to facilitate comparison with
prior work [7] that used this convention.
The architecture we use is based on the VGG network [39], which is commonly used in computer vision
applications. We control for generalization error by varying a size parameter s that defines the number of
units at each layer of the network. The architecture consists of two 3x3 convolutional layers with s filters
each, followed by a 2x2 max pooling layer, two 3x3 convolutional layers with 2s filters each, a 2x2 max
pooling layer, a fully-connected layer with 2s units, and a softmax output layer. All activation functions are
rectified linear. We chose s = 2i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7, as we did not observe qualitatively different results for larger
values of i. All training was done using the Adam optimizer [40] with the default parameters in the Keras
implementation (λ = 0.001, β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.99,  = 10
−8, and decay set to 5× 10−4). We used categorical
cross-entropy loss, which is conventional for models whose topmost activation is softmax [38].
MNIST. MNIST [41] consists of 70,000 images of handwritten digits formatted as grayscale 28×28-pixel
images, with class labels indicating the digit depicted in each image. We selected 17,500 points from the full
dataset at random for our experiments.
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100. The CIFAR datasets [42] consist of 60,000 32×32-pixel color images, labeled
as 10 (CIFAR-10) and 100 (CIFAR-100) classes. We selected 15,000 points at random from the full data.
6.2 Membership inference
The results of the membership inference attacks on linear and tree models are plotted in Figures 2a and
2b. The theoretical and experimental results appear to agree when the adversary knows both σS and σD
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(a) Regression and tree models assuming knowledge
of σS and σD.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Rcv/Remp
A
d
va
n
ta
ge
Theoretical
Eyedata
IWPC
Netflix
(b) Regression and tree models assuming knowledge
of σS only.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Rtest/Rtrain
A
d
va
n
ta
ge
Theoretical
MNIST
CIFAR10
CIFAR100
(c) Deep CNNs assuming knowledge of average train-
ing loss LS .
Figure 2: Empirical membership advantage of the threshold adversary (Adversary 2) given as a function of
generalization ratio for regression, tree, and CNN models.
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Our work Shokri et al. [7]
Attack
complexity
Makes only one query to the model Must train hundreds of shadow models
Required
knowledge
Average training loss LS
Ability to train shadow models, e.g., input
distribution and type of model
Precision
0.505 (MNIST)
0.694 (CIFAR-10)
0.874 (CIFAR-100)
0.517 (MNIST)
0.72-0.74 (CIFAR-10)
> 0.99 (CIFAR-100)
Recall > 0.99 > 0.99
Table 1: Comparison of our membership inference attack with that presented by Shokri et al. While our
attack has slightly lower precision, it requires far less computational resources and background knowledge.
and sets the decision boundary accordingly. However, when the adversary does not know σD, it performs
much better than what the theory predicts. In fact, an adversary can sometimes do better by just fixing
the decision boundary at || = σS instead of taking σD into account. This is because the training set error
distributions are not exactly Gaussian. Figures 5 and 6 in the appendix show that, although the training
set error distributions roughly match the shape of a Gaussian curve, they have a much higher peak at zero.
As a result, it is often advantageous to bring the decision boundaries closer to zero.
The results of the threshold adversary on CNNs are given in Figure 2c. Although these models perform
classification, the loss function used for training is categorical cross-entropy, which is non-negative, contin-
uous, and unbounded. This suggests that the threshold adversary could potentially work in this setting as
well. Specifically, the predictions made by these models can be compared against LS , the average training
loss observed during training, which is often reported with published architectures as a point of comparison
against prior work (see, for example, [43] and [44, Figures 3 and 4]). Figure 2c shows that, while the empirical
results do not match the theoretical curve as closely as do linear and tree models, they do not diverge as
much as one might expect given that the error is not Gaussian as assumed by Theorem 3.
Now we compare our attack with that by Shokri et al. [7], which generates “shadow models” that are
intended to mimic the behavior of AS . Because their attack involves using machine learning to train the
attacker with the shadow models, their attack requires considerable computational power and knowledge of
the algorithm used to train the model. By contrast, our attacker simply makes one query to the model and
needs to know only the average training loss. Despite these differences, when the size parameter s is set
equal to that used by Shokri et al., our attacker has the same recall and only slightly lower precision than
their attacker. A more detailed comparison is given in Table 1.
6.3 Attribute inference and reduction
We now present the empirical attribute advantage of the general adversary (Adversary 4). Because this
adversary uses the model inversion assumptions described at the beginning of Section 4.1, our evaluation is
also in the setting of model inversion. For these experiments we used the IWPC and Netflix datasets described
in Section 6.1. For fA(), the adversary’s approximation of the error distribution, we used the Gaussian with
mean zero and standard deviation Remp. For the IWPC dataset, each of the genomic attributes (VKORC1
and CYP2C9) is separately used as the target t. In the Netflix dataset, the target attribute was whether a
user rated a certain movie, and we randomly sampled targets from the set of available movies.
The circles in Figure 3 show the result of inverting the VKORC1 and CYP2C9 attributes in the IWPC
dataset. Although the attribute advantage is not as high as the membership advantage (solid line), the
attribute adversary exhibits a sizable advantage that increases as the model overfits more and more. On the
other hand, none of the attacks could effectively infer whether a user watched a certain movie in the Netflix
dataset. In addition, we were unable to simultaneously control for both σD/σS and τ in the Netflix dataset
to measure the effect of influence as predicted by Theorem 5.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the multi-query reduction adversary (Adversary 7). As the squares
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Figure 3: Experimentally determined advantage for various membership and attribute adversaries. The
plots correspond to: (a) threshold membership adversary (Adversary 2), (b) uniform reduction adversary
(Adversary 6), (c) general attribute adversary (Adversary 4), and (d) multi-query reduction adversary (Ad-
versary 7). Both reduction adversaries use the threshold membership adversary as the oracle, and fA() for
the attribute adversary is the Gaussian with mean zero and standard deviation σS .
in Figure 3 show, with the IWPC data, making multiple queries to the membership oracle significantly
increased the success rate compared to what we would expect from the naive uniform reduction adversary
(Adversary 6, dotted line). Surprisingly, the reduction is also more effective than running the attribute
inference attack directly. By contrast, with the Netflix data, the multi-query reduction adversary was often
slightly worse than the naive uniform adversary although it still outperformed direct attribute inference.
6.4 Collusion in membership inference
We evaluate AC and AC described in Section 3.4 for CNNs trained as image classifiers. To instantiate FK
and GK , we use Python’s intrinsic pseudorandom number generator with key K as the seed. We note
that our proof of Theorem 4 relies only on the uniformity of the pseudorandom numbers and not on their
unpredictability. Deviations from this assumption will result in a less effective membership inference attack
but do not invalidate our results. All experiments set the number of keys to k = 3.
The results of our experiment are shown in Figures 4a and 4b. The data shows that on all three instances,
the colluding parties achieve a high membership advantage without significantly affecting model performance.
The accuracy of the subverted model was only 0.014 (MNIST), 0.047 (CIFAR-10), and 0.031 (CIFAR-100)
less than that of the unsubverted model. The advantage rapidly increases with the model size around s ≈ 16
but is relatively constant elsewhere, indicating that model capacity beyond a certain point is a necessary
factor in the attack.
Importantly, the results demonstrate that specific information about nearly all of the training data can
be intentionally leaked through the behavior of a model that appears to generalize very well. In fact, looking
at Figure 4b shows that in these instances, there is no discernible relationship between generalization error
and membership advantage. The three datasets exhibit vastly different generalization behavior, with the
MNIST models achieving almost no generalization error (< 0.02 for s ≥ 32) and CIFAR-100 showing a large
performance gap (≥ 0.8 for s ≥ 32). Despite this fact, the membership adversary achieves nearly identical
performance.
7 Related Work
7.1 Privacy and statistical summaries
There is extensive prior literature on privacy attacks on statistical summaries. Komarova et al. [45] looked
into partial disclosure scenarios, where an adversary is given fixed statistical estimates from combined public
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(a) Advantage as a function of network size for AC
with k = 3. For s ≥ 16, CIFAR-10 and MNIST
achieve advantage at least 0.9 (precision ≥ 0.9, recall
≥ 0.99), whereas CIFAR-100 achieves advantage 0.98
(precision ≥ 0.99, recall ≥ 0.99).
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(b) Generalization error measured as the difference
between training and test accuracy. On MNIST, the
maximum was achieved at s = 8 at 0.05, while for
CIFAR-10 the maximum was 0.52 (s = 16), and 0.82
(s = 16) for CIFAR-100.
Figure 4: Results of colluding training algorithm and membership adversary on CNNs trained on MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100. The size parameter was configured to take values s = 2i for i ∈ [0, 7]. Regardless
of the models’ generalization performance, when the network is sufficiently large, the attack achieves high
advantage (≥ 0.98) without affecting predictive accuracy.
and private sources and attempts to infer the sensitive feature of an individual referenced in those sources.
A number of previous studies [21, 22, 46, 47, 48, 49] have looked into membership attacks from statistics
commonly published in genome-wide association studies (GWAS). Calandrino et al. [50] showed that temporal
changes in recommendations given by collaborative filtering methods can reveal the inputs that caused those
changes. Linear reconstruction attacks [51,52,53] attempt to infer partial inputs to linear statistics and were
later extended to non-linear statistics [54]. While the goal of these attacks has commonalities with both
membership inference and attribute inference, our results apply specifically to machine learning settings
where generalization error and influence make our results relevant.
7.2 Privacy and machine learning
More recently, others have begun examining these attacks in the context of machine learning. Ateniese et
al. [1] showed that the knowledge of the internal structure of Support Vector Machines and Hidden Markov
Models leaks certain types of information about their training data, such as the language used in a speech
dataset.
Dwork et al. [13] showed that a differentially private algorithm with a suitably chosen parameter gener-
alizes well with high probability. Subsequent work showed that similar results are true under related notions
of privacy. In particular, Bassily et al. [18] studied a notion of privacy called total variation stability and
proved good generalization with respect to a bounded number of adaptively chosen low-sensitivity queries.
Moreover, for data drawn from Gibbs distributions, Wang et al. [19] showed that on-average KL privacy is
equivalent to generalization error as defined in this paper. While these results give evidence for the rela-
tionship between privacy and overfitting, we construct an attacker that directly leverages overfitting to gain
advantage commensurate with the extent of the overfitting.
7.2.1 Membership inference
Shokri et al. [7] developed a membership inference attack and applied it to popular machine-learning-as-a-
service APIs. Their attacks are based on “shadow models” that approximate the behavior of the model under
attack. The shadow models are used to build another machine learning model called the “attack model”,
which is trained to distinguish points in the training data from other points based on the output they induce
on the original model under attack. As we discussed in Section 6.2, our simple threshold adversary comes
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surprisingly close to the accuracy of their attack, especially given the differences in complexity and requisite
adversarial assumptions between the attacks.
Because the attack proposed by Shokri et al. itself relies on machine learning to find a function that
separates training and non-training points, it is not immediately clear why the attack works, but the au-
thors hypothesize that it is related to overfitting and the “diversity” of the training data. They graph the
generalization error against the precision of their attack and find some evidence of a relationship, but they
also find that the relationship is not perfect and conclude that model structure must also be relevant. The
results presented in this paper make the connection to overfitting precise in many settings, and the colluding
training algorithm we give in Section 6.4 demonstrates exactly how model structure can be exploited to
create a membership inference vulnerability.
Li et al. [6] explored membership inference, distinguishing between “positive” and “negative” membership
privacy. They show how this framework defines a family of related privacy definitions that are parametrized
on distributions of the adversary’s prior knowledge, and they find that a number of previous definitions can
be instantiated in this way.
7.2.2 Attribute inference
Practical model inversion attacks have been studied in the context of linear regression [4,8], decision trees [3],
and neural networks [3]. Our results apply to these attacks when they are applied to data that matches
the distributional assumptions made in our analysis. An important distinction between the way inversion
attacks were considered in prior work and how we treat them here is the notion of advantage. Prior work
on these attacks defined advantage as the difference between the attacker’s predictive accuracy given the
model and the best accuracy that could be achieved without the model. Although some prior work [3, 4]
empirically measured this advantage on both training and test datasets, this definition does not allow a
formal characterization of how exposed the training data specifically is to privacy risk. In Section 4, we
define attribute advantage precisely to capture the risk to the training data by measuring the difference in
the attacker’s accuracy on training and test data: the advantage is zero when the attack is as powerful on
the general population as on the training data and is maximized when the attack works only on the training
data.
Wu et al. [5] formalized model inversion for a simplified class of models that consist of Boolean functions
and explored the initial connections between influence and advantage. However, as in other prior work on
model inversion, the type of advantage that they consider says nothing about what the model specifically
leaks about its training data. Drawing on their observation that influence is relevant to privacy risk in
general, we illustrate its effect on the notion of advantage defined in this paper and show how it interacts
with generalization error.
8 Conclusion and Future Directions
We introduced new formal definitions of advantage for membership and attribute inference attacks. Using
these definitions, we analyzed attacks under various assumptions on learning algorithms and model proper-
ties, and we showed that these two attacks are closely related through reductions in both directions. Both
theoretical and experimental results confirm that models become more vulnerable to both types of attacks
as they overfit more. Interestingly, our analysis also shows that overfitting is not the only factor that can
lead to privacy risk: Theorem 4 shows that even stable learning algorithms, which provably do not overfit,
can leak precise membership information, and the results in Section 4.1 demonstrate that the influence of
the target attribute on a model’s output plays a key role in attribute inference.
Our formalization and analysis open interesting directions for future work. The membership attack
in Theorem 4 is based on a colluding pair of adversary and learning rule, AC and AC. This could be
implemented, for example, by a malicious ML algorithm provided by a third-party library or cloud service
to subvert users’ privacy. Further study of this scenario, which may best be formalized in the framework
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of algorithm substitution attacks [23], is warranted to determine whether malicious algorithms can produce
models that are indistinguishable from normal ones and how such attacks can be mitigated.
Our results in Section 3.1 give bounds on membership advantage when certain conditions are met. These
bounds apply to adversaries who may target specific individuals, bringing arbitrary background knowledge of
their targets to help determine their membership status. Some types of realistic adversaries may be motivated
by concerns that incentivize learning a limited set of facts about as many individuals in the training data
as possible rather than obtaining unique background knowledge about specific individuals. Characterizing
these “stable adversaries” is an interesting direction that may lead to tighter bounds on advantage or relaxed
conditions on the learning rule.
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Figure 5: The training and test error distributions for an overfitted Ridge regression model. The histograms
are juxtaposed with what we would expect if the errors were normally distributed with standard deviation
Remp = 0.2774 and Rcv = 0.8884, respectively. Note the different vertical scale for the two graphs. To
minimize the effect of noise, the errors were measured using 1000 different random 75-25 splits of the data
into training and test sets and then aggregated.
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.50
0.02
0.04
error
fr
eq
u
en
cy
Training Set Error (IWPC, decision tree with depth = 15)
Experimental
Gaussian
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.50
0.02
0.04
error
fr
eq
u
en
cy
Test Set Error (IWPC, decision tree with depth = 15)
Experimental
Gaussian
Figure 6: The training and test error distributions for an overfitted decision tree. The histograms are
juxtaposed with what we would expect if the errors were normally distributed with standard deviation
Remp = 0.3899 and Rcv = 0.9507, respectively. The bar at error = 0 does not fit inside the first graph; in
order to fit it, the graph would have to be almost 10 times as high. To minimize the effect of noise, the
errors were measured using 1000 different random 75-25 splits of the data into training and test sets and
then aggregated.
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